Abstract-This paper presents a critical analysis and statistical evaluation of two categories of physically unclonable functions (PUFs): ring oscillator PUF and a new proposed adapted latch-based PUF. The main contribution is that of measuring the properties of PUF which provide the basic information for using them in security applications. The original method involved the conceptual design of adapted latch-based PUFs and ring oscillator PUFs in combination with peripheral devices in order to create an environment for experimental analysis of PUF properties. Implementation, testing, and analysis of results followed. This approach has applications on high-level security.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N the past two decades, advances in programmable device technologies, both hardware and software areas, have been extraordinary [7] . The original application to rapid prototyping in a large number of areas such as: medical apparatus, automotive industry, industrial control systems, remote sensing, data complex computations, or robotics has been complemented with a large number of new applications in the security domain [8] - [10] . New security methods are based on physically unclonable functions (PUFs). A mutual authentication scheme between the field-programmable gate array (FPGA) chip manufacturers and the IP providers is presented in [13] . In [21] , the authors described a method for authentication via challenge-response pairs (CRP). PUFs can be also used to extract chip-unique signature and volatile secret keys which can be used in cryptographic protocols or authentication schemes. An overview of the most important implementation details and experimental results for the PUFs is presented in [1] and [12] . An important analysis regarding the techniques for design and implementation of an FPGA PUF circuit is presented in [11] . This paper describes the implementation details and experimental analysis and results regarding a ring oscillator PUF (a delay-based PUF) and an adapted latch-based PUF (a memory-based PUF) to fulfill an FPGA practical approach. Two PUF circuits suitable for an FPGA implementation, described in the literature, are SRAM PUF and programmable delay line (PDL) PUF.
Experiments regarding the SRAM PUF are presented in [1] but this PUF suffers from two main drawbacks: 1) the SRAM PUF is not available on all mainstream FPGA platforms (because no uninitialized SRAM is available on most types) [23] ; nowadays, most of the FPGA manufacturers reset the startup state-of-the SRAM cells to a known value, rendering the SRAM-PUF difficult to be used [17] , [18] ; 2) the response of the SRAM PUF is generated only on the power-up state-of-the circuit, the output of the PUF circuit could not be regenerated while the circuit is operational [16] . Sander et al. [17] attempt to remove the fundamental obstacle Xilinx FPGAs have-from the SRAM-PUF point of view-by using a work around that enables to disconnect uninstantiated BRAM from the power supply network. The complex mechanism is based on three partial reconfigurations and the results regarding the uniqueness are not successful. As an alternative to SRAM PUF, memorybased PUFs that use the basic principle of SRAM PUF started to appear: SR latch PUF, D flip-flop PUF, butterfly PUF, or buskeeper PUF cell [1] . All of these require careful routing in order to be implemented on FPGA. For FPGA, programming is done through logic blocks and interconnects; the gate level structure cannot be accessed, in order to exploit layout design techniques.
PDLs are introduced in [19] in order to accurately equalize the signal arrival times to flip-flop. PUF circuits based on identical and symmetrical interconnections may use PDLs in order to adjust their values of propagation times. In [20] , Majzoobi et al. use PDL to cancel out delay skews caused by asymmetries in routing and systematic variations for an arbiter PUF. Their mechanism of adjusting delays is complex and requires a nonnegligible effort to implement in practice. In this paper, the efforts were focused on trying to find out identical or slightly different interconnections. This paper presents the experimental results obtained by considering the interconnects inside PUFs slightly differently. The PDLs are a novel mechanism that may help constructing PUFs when the identical or slightly different interconnections could not be achieved. In this study, the correct timing was accomplished without PDLs.
According to [1] , there are two delay-based PUFs: the arbiter PUF and the ring oscillator PUF. There are some differences between the presented implementation and testing approach and other experiments, which are described briefly below. The ring oscillator circuit is analyzed in this paper on two different FPGA families: Spartan 3E and Spartan 6. The Spartan 3E was released in 2004, on 90-nm copper process technology [15] . The Spartan 6 is built in 2009, on a 45-nm nine-metal layer and dualoxide process technology [14] . Besides other experiments, details of implementation and measurements of propagation times through gates and interconnections are presented for these two FPGA families. There are differences in FPGA architectures between families and the results presented in this paper show that PUF circuits may be implemented despite architecture differences; moreover, the uniqueness and reliability properties are not affected by those differences. The random level of the PUF responses, and by default the uniqueness property, is increased due to differences in the FPGA family architecture. Also, the properties of PUF circuits are analyzed along IP cores and digital circuits with different complexities because one of the main applications is to protect critical information acquired and processed in complex system-on-chips implemented on FPGAs using the generated PUF-based secret key. Even if the RO PUF is designed and implemented as a hard macro, and when duplicated all routing and logic resources will remain identical, the other digital components used to obtain the response of the PUF circuits (e.g., counters) are placed and routed by the synthesis tool. These changes may be reflected in the reliability of RO PUF circuits. This paper also explains how the digital circuit activity can influence the RO PUF responses. The internal activities of the circuits produce delay variations (nanovariations) through gates and interconnections between gates. The process variations also affect the electrical parameters of logical gates and interconnections and by default the delays are affected by the internal activities. This paper shows that the uniqueness property of PUF circuits is obtained through both types of variations and analyzes how the reliability property responds to both types of variations.
The latch-based PUF is not widely researched. Due to its requirements of symmetry, it is difficult to implement it on FPGA devices. There are few results in the research literature regarding the latch-based PUFs implemented on FPGAs. In [5] , a design and implementation of a true random generator is presented, which exploits the metastability of the RS latch for an FPGA device. In [6] , Yamamoto et al. introduced a novel structure with random latches for generating high-entropy responses using randomness. The study mentioned above [6] does not include implementation details; therefore, it is unclear how the identical and symmetrical interconnections are obtained. The aim of this paper is to implement and evaluate another possible PUF circuit appropriate for different FPGA architectures. After an exhaustive analysis of PUF results presented in the dedicated literature and after many attempts to obtain symmetrical and identical routes using the Xilinx FPGA Editor, it has been concluded that another good candidate for FPGA PUF is a circuit with minimum requirements of identical interconnects. This paper presents the possibilities to obtain interconnections between logic blocks, with related propagation times, and use them in order to construct a latch-based PUF circuit.
PUFs are also susceptible to temporal variations, such as changes in voltage, temperature, and silicon aging, which makes it difficult to reliably produce the correct PUF output at all times.
Circuit operation also induces power supply voltage variations, namely power supply noise [2] . When an input pattern signal is applied to a circuit, it will generate a large number of switches in the circuit. These will increase the dynamic power consumption, causing a voltage drop on power lines and a voltage increase on ground lines. This effect is known as power supply noise. Temperature distribution also depends on the location of the switches [3] . Even by applying the same signal patterns to the inputs of the same digital circuit implemented on different chips, it will induce different temperature and voltage drops. This paper presents a conceptual design and a statistical analysis of two PUF circuits using 30 identical Spartan 3E Starter Boards and a Spartan 6 board. An experimental environment (test bed) is conceptually designed and implemented in order to analyze how much the PUF answer reproducibility is influenced by the running system on chip (SoC) or by the complexity of the register transfer level (RTL) design. In order to implement the protective method based on PUFs for FPGA applications, PUF circuits must be placed and routed on the unused hardware resources, near the complex logic which implements the entire system. Thus, this paper also focuses on how the digital circuit activity can influence the PUF responses, because one of the main applications is to protect critical information that is acquired and processed in complex SoCs implemented on FPGAs using the generated PUF-based secret key.
The original contributions to knowledge presented in this paper can be summarized as consisting of the following: 1) the method for obtaining identical and symmetrical routes in order to construct a PUF circuit on two different FPGA architectures without PDLs; 2) a novel mechanism making the latch-based PUF a good candidate for FPGA implementation; 3) an environment for the experimental analysis of PUF properties along with analysis results; 4) an original theoretical perspective demonstrating that the internal activity of the digital system implemented on FPGA contributes, along the process variations, to the uniqueness and randomness of the PUF responses.
II. SYSTEM CONCEPT
A new system concept for securing the FPGA SoC is introduced. This is based on encrypted and authenticated communication between SoC peripherals. One system composed of two microprocessors and some peripherals may be used as example. The peripherals may be further classified in two domains: the first domain is composed of Microblaze1, RS232 controller, DRAM memory, and cryptographic coprocessor and the second domain contains Microblaze2, Ethernet controller, DRAM memory, and cryptographic coprocessor. The first domain is considered as the critical domain, in which data are sensitive and must be exchanged considering the encryption and authentication set of rules. Each domain has a secret key generated using PUF circuits. The peripherals from the same domain have access to the domain's secret key and a wrapper with cryptographic algorithms in order to authenticate, encrypt, or decrypt the messages send or received, based on the domain's secret key. The method may be also used when there is more than one critical domain. For each domain a distinct key, based on PUF circuits, must be generated. This paper analyses the possibility of generating distinct PUF keys on the same FPGA device: one for each domain. The system described before (or another one with more critical domains) is implemented on a single FPGA device and each domain has a PUF secret key. So there may be more PUF secret keys on the same device. In order to use those secret keys in a security application, the correlation of these PUF secret keys must be analyzed. This is done by also measuring the uniqueness and reproducibility, by considering one board divided into four distinct parts or four distinct identical small devices. This concept may also be applied to a more complex system.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
The method followed for the design and implementation of the PUF circuits and the experimental environment consists of three steps.
A. PUF Design Method Using Manual Placement and Routing on FPGA Resources
Two ring oscillators generate periodical signals with frequencies freq1 and freq2, which are connected to the clock input of two counters. Ideally, the freq1 and freq2 frequencies are identical, and, therefore, the two counters should reach their maximum value at the same time. However, one of the counters will arrive first at the maximum value and the comparator's output will be set to 1 or 0, depending on the process variations. Since producing a ring oscillator response generally involves a physical measurement, there are a number of unwanted physical side effects, produced by temperature or voltage variations, which could interfere. Due to the fact that adjacent FPGA locations are influenced by the similar environmental condition, ring oscillators placed in adjacent locations on the FPGA are compared. The ring oscillator generates a periodical signal. The periodically generated signal is given as t = tp in v e r t o r + tp in t e r c o n n e c t io n + Δ p r o c e s s va r i a t i o n s
where tp invertor is the CMOS inverter propagation delay, tp interconnection is the propagation delay on interconection line, and Δ process variations are the process variations. The ring oscillator is implemented as a hard macro and the gates and interconnections between them are manually placed and routed. Figs. 1 and 2 show the estimated delays between gates and interconnections provided by the Xilinx FPGA Editor. The implementation is made on Spartan 3E XC3S500E device and Spartan 6 XCSLX45 device. The latch-based PUF circuit is composed of a digital latch and a capture signal which could be the terminal counter signal generated by a counter when it over-or underflows. Starting from the premise that interconnections between gates are identical and symmetrical and applying a "high" active signal on the circuit's input, the two outputs of the NAND gates will oscillate. In reality, even with the NAND gates and the interconnections between them manually placed and routed, there will be differences between the interconnections, and the two outputs of the NAND gates will randomly oscillate. On account of the FPGA routing complexity and limitations, delay differences between the interconnections start to appear. The output of the latch circuit is, thus, biased because of this inconvenience. In order to obtain an unpredictable response from the latch, despite the delay differences, the two NAND outputs oscillate for a period of time and their values are captured in a moment specified by a capture signal. The oscillating period depends on how long the applied input is active "high." The output response depends on the process variations due to the following: 1) the signal's oscillating period T depends on the propagation time of the NAND gates t NAND , on the propagation time of the interconnect routes t interconnects and on the process variations Δp 1 , 2) the propagation time of the interconnect between the circuit that generates the oscillating signal and the NAND gates is also influenced by the process variations Δp 2 .
3) The propagation time of the interconnect between the circuit that generates the capture signal and the outputs of the NAND gates is also determined by the process variations Δp 3 . The process variations from three distinct places Δp 1 , Δp 2 , Δp 3 determine the unpredictable response. Figs. 3 and 4 present the implementation details of latch-based PUF as a hard macrocomponent. The gates, the flip-flops, and the interconnections between them were manually placed and routed. Many attempts were made in order to achieve the optimal and correct timing, including tricks like the ones presented in PDLs but without selection. However, the propagation time values discussed in this paper and in other research articles are estimated values by the Xilinx FPGA Editor. In reality, those values may have slight differences.
B. Standalone PUF ID Design on FPGA device
In order to measure the two important PUF properties, uniqueness and reproducibility, two cases are considered. In the first one, n PUF circuits at one moment are considered [see Fig. 5(a) ]. The answer is measured and then the PUF circuits are relocated to other FPGA hardware configuration logic blocks and the measurements are repeated. There are 128 PUFs in case of the ring oscillator circuit and 77 PUFs in case of the latch-based circuit for one measurement. In the second case, the FPGA is divided in four parts and four unique identifiers are considered. The FPGA may be viewed as four distinct devices [see Fig. 5(b) ]. Compared with the previous scenario, the four unique identifiers are placed simultaneously on the device. The four unique identifiers are each of 32-bits length.
In both cases, the PUF answers which compute the unique identifier are observed using the Xilinx ChipScope Analyzer.
The binary sequences generated using 128 ring oscillator PUFs or 77 latch-based PUFs were tested using temperature variations. The commercial temperature range is between 0°C and 85°C, while the industrial temperature range is between −40 and 100°C. The FPGA device was gradually heated using a hairdryer in a range of temperature from 22 to 78°C. The FPGA was also cooled to −5°C. The number of unreliable bits was observed in these conditions. Spartan 3E XC3S500E devices are used in order to measure the uniqueness and the reproducibility. The measurements are made on 30 identical devices.
C. PUF ID Design in Combination With RTL Complex System or SoC on FPGA Devices
Generally a SoC, which also includes security technology based on PUF, contains: 1) the logic that implements the functionality of the system and 2) the PUF circuits and some additional logic in order to process the PUFs' answer. The logic which implements the functionality of the system could be a larger digital system implemented in hardware description languages, such as phone switches, factory controllers, large stationary installations (traffic lights), or systems based on microprocessors which run complex software/firmware programs. There are two issues that must be analyzed: 1) if the PUF together with the complex logic of digital circuits, placed on FPGA hardware resources, have the same answers as the PUF placed on FPGA hardware resources without the complex logic of digital circuit, and 2) if the PUF answers remain constant (or the answer varies with certain limits) during the SoC operation. In the first case, even if the PUF answers are not the same in both situations, this will not affect the security primitive based on PUF. It may be said that the changes contribute to the uniqueness of the identifier. In the second case, if the answer varies with certain limits, with the help of an error correcting code, the security primitive based on PUF could be usedthe reproducibility property is not affected. Three cases are considered.
In the first case, a simple digital design is considered, consisting of a few binary counters. The values of the PUF answers may be analyzed in three scenarios: 1) collecting the PUF answers when only PUF circuits are instantiating on FPGA hardware resources; 2) collecting the PUF answers when PUF circuits are placed and routed near counters; 3) placing the PUFs and the counters as in case B, except that the counters are inactive.
In the second case, a complex design written in VHDL (a controller for a TFT touch screen) provided by Digilent Inc is considered. The PUF instances are placed near the TFT controller, as can be seen in Fig. 6 . The IP cores which are content in the TFT controller were placed as can be seen in Fig. 6 , using the PlanAhead software tool. The PUF answers are tested with and without the TFT controller, keeping the same hardware configuration logic blocks for PUF circuits.
The third scenario considers a different approach based on a software implementation running on a build around the Microblaze microprocessor that runs a simple C program which copies the values from the switch buttons to the LEDs. The PUF circuits are placed as shown in Fig. 7 . The PUF answers are tested with and without the SoC, maintaining the same locations for PUF circuits.
The hardware equipment used for the experimental results contains an Atlys board with Spartan 6 FPGA and an LCD touch screen. The software implementation tools used are: Xilinx 12.1 with ISE Design Tools, FPGA Editor, Planahead for manual placing and routing, and EDK Development Kit.
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The results obtained through the methodology presented in Section III are analyzed in order to conclude if the PUF circuits may be used in the newly introduced security methods.
A. Results of PUF Design Method Using Manual Placement and Routing on FPGA Resources
Implementation of the ring oscillator PUF occupies entirely one configurable logic block with four and, respectively, 2 Slices on Spartan 3E and Spartan 6 devices. Two other binary counters and a crossing clock domain circuit are necessary in order to compute one ring oscillator PUF answer. This implementation uses 13 bits width binary counters in order to obtain an accurate response.
Implementation of the latch-based PUF occupies partially three configurable logic blocks on both Spartan 3E and Spartan 6. Many other configurations were tried but this one with three CLBs was chosen due to its closely related interconnections, as can be seen in Figs. 3 and 4 . One 13 width binary counter to 15 latch-based PUF circuits is needed in order to generate the oscillating and capture signals.
Considering this, it can be said that the latch-based PUF implementation is more compact and less area expensive then the ring oscillator PUF implementation. The results illustrated in Figs. 1-4 , indicate that the hard macro in Spartan 6 has much more delay compared to Spartan 3E implementation. There are two factors which cause this. The first one relates to the differences in FPGA Slice architectures: in the case of Spartan 3E, the Slices have 2 LUTs with four inputs each whereas in the case of Spartan 6, the Slices have four LUTs with six inputs each. The second factor relates to the requirement of balanced timing (equal propagation times) for interconnections leading to different routing and placement of logic gates inside the hard macro, as can be seen from Figs. 3 and 4. In order to obtain minimum differences between the propagation times inside the hard macro, the delays are larger for Spartan 6, although the Spartan 6 FPGA families are faster. The differences inside PUF hard macros, obtained for different FPGA families, emphasize the randomness or uniqueness of PUF circuits in different FPGA families.
B. Results of Standalone PUF ID Design on FPGA Device
Considering the sequences of unique identifiers based on PUFs, it may be said that two important properties are: uniqueness and reproducibility. One possible measure of uniqueness, which is provided in most experimental results, is the interHamming distance histogram, summarized by its average value. The reproducibility property is clear from its description. The responses to different evaluations of the same challenge x on the same PUF should be closed in the considered distance metric. For experimental results, this is mostly measured by the intra-Hamming distance histogram and summarized by its average value. From the statistical point of view, the FPGA population, including all the Spartan 3E XC3S500 devices, is defined. Computing parameters about FPGA population are desired but there is no access to all devices around the world. So a sample of the population is considered: 30 FPGA available devices. Fig. 8 presents the inter-Hamming distance histogram for case 1 in Section III-B using 128 ring oscillator PUFs. Fig. 9 shows the inter-Hamming distance histogram for case 1 in Section III-B using 77 latch-based PUF. Figs. 10 and 11 illustrate the inter-Hamming distance histogram for case 2 in Section III-B using four of the 32 length unique identifiers generated us- ing ring oscillator PUF respectively latch-based PUF. All figures show that the inter-Hamming distance histogram has a normal distribution. Considering the definition of central limit theorem, the mean and the standard deviation of all samples from the same population will be approximately equal to the mean and standard deviation of the population. Figs. 8-11 show the interchip Hamming distance measured between two different ID sequences in both cases A and B. The inter-Hamming distance must be approx. 50% of different bits of their total number. Figs. 12 and 13 show the Hamming distance between two identification sequences generated under the same conditions. The intra-Hamming distance must be about 10% unreliable bits from their total number.
The inter-Hamming distance results show that the FPGA could be identified using these sequences. Moreover, Figs. 10 and 11 show that there may be distinct IDs on the same FPGA meaning that there may be IDs or IP cores for each domain. This will allow it to implement the security protocol where IP cores are divided into different security level domains and each domain will receive a different ID.
The intra-Hamming distance results show that there are a few unreliable bits (unstable bits) from one running to another and they may be detected and corrected using error-correcting codes, like Bose, Ray-Chaudhuri, Hocquenghem (BCH). The experiments in conditions of temperature variation show that there are maximum eight unreliable bits in case of 128 ring oscillator PUFs and maximum five unreliable bits in case of 77 latch-based PUFs.
In case of integrated circuits, ASICs or FPGAs, the process of aging affects the same physical parameters as process variations: negative bias temperature instability, hot carrier injection, oxide breakdown, electromigration. Moreover, the aging effects are similar with temperature and voltage variations. The problem with the irreversible aging process of integrated circuits is that it may affect the reliability of the PUF responses. The practical experiments carried out, which are presented in this paper, show that the aging may not be seen as a reliability problem due to following reasons: 1) The implementation of the ring oscillator PUF was performed at the end of 2012, whereas the implementation of the latch PUF was carried out at the beginning of 2014. Since then, the PUFs were measured and analyzed several times on different scenarios and the reliability was the same-maximum 8% of unreliable bits from the total number of PUF responses that was considered; 2) the FPGAs used in those experiments are Spartan 3E and Spartan 6. The Spartan 3E boards were purchased in 2004 and since then they were used frequently in student laboratories or home work projects. Despite the fact that these boards have been used intensively for more than ten years, the results of PUF properties are satisfactory; 3) based on the idea that aging is employed in constructing a PUF [22] , the analysis in this paper shows that the aging process may increase the randomness and implicitly also the uniqueness of PUF responses. In case of a large number of unreliable bits, the PUF-based identification scheme may be regenerated. Moreover, for the application introduced in this paper, a large value of unreliability will increase the security of the mechanism. The encryption between peripherals may be based on a pseudorandom generator started with a PUF-based binary sequence.
According to the experimental results, the validation of the use of the ring oscillators PUF or latch-based PUF to generate a unique identifier for FPGA devices has succeed.
C. Results of PUF ID Design in Combination With RTL Complex System or SoC on FPGA Devices
The results regarding how the circuit activity influences the two PUF properties are presented considering the three scenarios described in Section III-C. In the first scenario, only 24 PUF instances are taken into consideration, based on ring oscillator. For the three scenarios, the results are satisfactory: in both cases, there are related values for PUF answers and there are a maximum of four unreliable bits (unstable bits), which can be corrected using an error correction code. When the PUF outputs are measured without count instances, the entire design is resynthesized, which may explain the different position of unreliable bits between the three cases. Another 24 PUF circuits are instantiated near the previous one. Also, in this case, all situations mentioned above are analyzed. The results are related with the previous ones; the 4-5 different bits could be corrected using error correcting codes.
Second, the ring oscillator PUF instances are replaced with latch-based PUF instances and also increase the number of latchbased PUF instances. The locations and the first scenario presented in Section III-C are maintained.
The results are presented in Fig. 14 including the following seven cases: 1) PUF instances without binary counter instances, 2) PUF instances without binary counter instances after resynthesis, 3) PUF instances without binary counter instances after another resynthesis, 4) PUF instances with a binary counter instance on each row, 5) PUF instances with three binary counter instances on each row, 6) PUF instances with more binary counter instances, and 7) PUF instances with maximum number of binary sequences which fit the FPGA hardwarex resources.
In the second scenario, the design was synthesized for two times and the ring oscillator PUF instances were placed and routed identical with the ones used in the first scenario. The PUF outputs with and without the complex VHDL design are measured. The first remark is that even if the ring oscillator PUF instances have the same placement and routing, the ID values are different in the two scenarios.
This may be explained considering the following assumptions: 1) the PUF instances are collected using the logic analyzer ChipScope Pro Analyzer and that could influence the fan out of the digital gate contained in the PUF instances; 2) the counters and the comparators used to compute the PUF instances are placed differently by the Xilinx synthesis tool in the two scenarios and this influences the fan out; 3) the circuit activity influences the PUF responses through temperature variations. To limit the effects of the fan out on the gate propagation delays, a flip-flop circuit is placed on the ring oscillator output and the flip-flop output is connected to the logic analyzer or to the counters and comparators. Considering these, it can be said that the digital circuit activity influences the PUF responses in the first two scenarios. In case of the latch-based PUFs, the conclusions are the same as in the ring oscillator case. Fig. 15 presents the results regarding the unreliable bits for ring oscillator PUF and latch-based PUF with the following two cases: 1) PUF instances without complex RTL design, and 2) PUF instances with complex RTL design.
The third scenario considers a system design build around the Microblaze microprocessor which runs a simple C program which copies the values from the switch buttons to the leds. The results are presented in Fig. 16 considering the two cases: 1) PUF instances without SoC implementation, and 2) PUF instances with SoC implementation.
The PUF responses have been measured since the PUF implementations were in the final version (the end of 2012 for the ring oscillator; the beginning of 2014 for the latch-based PUF). Each time the measurements were performed, the reliability property had the same value; less than 8% of the bits from the total number of generated PUF responses are unreliable. Each time the measurements were performed, around ten collected results were taken into account. During the last 2-3 years, the PUF results were carefully monitored several times and the uniqueness and reliability properties were successfully achieved every time. The final measurement lasted three weeks, while the PUF responses were collected and monitored. The results obtained were successful, as in the previous cases.
Theoretically, the responses of the PUF circuits have the same value, whether the instances are placed on different FPGAs or on the same FPGA but in different locations. Practically, there will be differences between the responses of PUF circuits due to process variations. These are produced by physical imperfections that may arise during the execution phase of the integrated circuits, as the manufacturing process produces involuntary deviations of physical parameters from the normal values. Changes in these parameters cause electrical parameters to vary, such as sheet resistance and threshold voltage. Section III-A contains details regarding where and how the process variations are emphasized by the PUF circuits. Changes in electrical parameters affect the switching speed of digital signals, the temperature or voltage variations produced by the circuit activity, the power supply noise, the propagation time through digital gates, or interconnections introducing random jitter. The entire FPGA surface, and, as a consequence also the entire digital design implemented on FPGA are affected by process variations. As it was shown in the scenarios described and implemented within this paper, although these variations in temperature, voltage, and delays are small enough not to alter the normal circuit behavior (their values are included in the worst-case scenario provided by the synthesis tool), they are significant for PUF circuits.
According to the experimental results presented in Figs. 12-16, there is an 8% total number of few unreliable bits from the total number of instantiated PUF circuits. For a sequence of PUF answers, which can be used as a cryptographic key for FPGA devices, it is important that the number of unreliable bits is convenient and could be corrected in order to obtain the same key on each situation. The number of accepted errors that may be corrected with an error correction and detection algorithm is maximum 10% of the identifier length [1] . Examples of error correction and detection algorithms are BCH and Reed-Solomon codes. The mathematical theory and the hardware implementation of the error detection and correction BCH algorithm are discussed in [4] . For example, regeneration of a cryptographic key based on 128 ring oscillator PUFs has two stages: 1) the generation of a helper data and 2) the regeneration phase. The first phase is used only once (or each time the FPGA is powered up) for a cryptographic key. It generates the 128-bits length identifier (cryptographic key) based on ring oscillators. From this 128-bits length sequence, a helper dataset is generated, which will be used each time for regeneration. The second phase involves the reconstruction of the identification sequence.
In the case of FPGA devices, it is not mandatory to store the helper data in a nonvolatile memory. Such data may be stored in LUT registers or BRAM memories available on the programmable device. Erasing the stored data after losing the power supply voltage is not an inconvenient in case of FPGA devices. The authentication phase may be executed after each power up. There are two advantages in this case. The first one is that storing the helper data on FPGA hardware resources will increase the difficulty of a recovery attack and will affect the PUF responses (any attempt to read the value of helper data means direct contact with the physical device, which will lead to PUF responses modifications). Obtaining helper data capable of correcting maximum 10% of total number of bits will not help to obtain the PUF secret key and this is also the case when the storage is a nonvolatile memory. The second advantage is related to unreliable bits and aging of integrated circuits. The execution of the authentication phase will occasionally eliminate the unpleasant effects of increasing the number of unreliable bits, in case such effects exist. Moreover, this paper introduces two weak PUFs (the number of challenges the PUF can accept is very limited) for using them in secure key generation. The machine learning attacks reported in the literature are mostly convenient to strong PUFs (with a large number of CRP, such as Arbiter PUF). No generic manipulation of helper data have been published so far [24] . The malicious modification of helper data will lead to PUF responses alterations or even chip destructions.
Moreover, there may be cases in which the modification of helper data will generate a modified PUF-based key that may be used forward in secure key generation, since the PUF key value has not been disclosed.
V. CONCLUSION
Conceptual design and implementation details of two PUF circuits, which are reliable for FPGA security methods, were presented. The use of the ring oscillators PUF and latch-based PUF to generate a unique identifier for FPGA devices were validated through implementation and the experimental results presented on Section IV. The experiments were performed on two FPGA families. Section IV shows that the on-chip temperature variations contribute to the uniqueness property and does not affect the reproducibility property.
Even if the circuit design influences the PUF answers, the number of unreliable bits is small enough to be corrected using an algorithm for error correcting codes. It has been shown that the circuit activity contributes to the uniqueness of the ID generated using PUFs; for different designs on the same FPGA chip, the ID will be slowly different due to temperature variations produced by internal activity. The security application introduced in Section II may use a pseudorandom generator based on PUF cryptographic key. In this case, the unreliable bits will increase the security strength of the mechanism. Environmental variations generated by circuit activity are also distinct from chip to chip due to process variations. These environmental variations could increase the random level of the PUF answers and not their unreliability.
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that distinct IDs on the same FPGA and distinct IDs for each domain or IP cores may exists on the same device. This will allow the implementation of the security protocol where IP cores are divided into different security level domains and each domain will receive a different ID.
